We formulate a way to study whether the asymmetry of buyers (in the sense of having di®erent prior probability distributions of valuations) is helpful to the seller in private-value auctions (asked¯rst by Cantillon [2001]). In our proposed formulation, this question corresponds to two important questions previously asked: Does a¯rst-price auction have higher revenue than a second-price auction when buyers have asymmetric distributions (asked by Maskin and Riley [2000])? And does a seller enhance revenue by releasing information (asked by Milgrom and Weber[1982] )? This is shown by constructing two Harsanyi games of incomplete information each having the same ex-ante distribution of valuations but in one beliefs are symmetric while in the other beliefs are sometimes asymmetric. Our main result is that answers to all three questions coincide when values are independent and are related when values are a±liated.
The purpose of this note is to suggest a way to formulate and study the question of whether asymmetry of buyers (in the sense of having di®erent prior probability distributions of valuations) is helpful or harmful to the seller in private-value auctions. Do they generate higher or lower expected selling revenue than auctions in which buyers are symmetric?
The asymmetry in an auction (which treats the buyers equally such as the¯rst or second price auction) can be in the distributions of the buyers' valuations or in the buyers' beliefs. The¯rst point we make is that the only meaningful and interesting question about the e®ects on revenue is with respect to asymmetry of beliefs of the buyers. Distribution of valuations, whether symmetric or asymmetric, are part of the data of the situation. This probability distribution over the state of nature is not controlled by the seller or by us as analysts. Comparing an asymmetric auction to some benchmark symmetric auction (with a distribution based upon the asymmetric distributions), can easily lead to di®erent results, depending on how this benchmark is chosen. Consider for example a two-buyer,¯rst-price auction (G; H) where the buyers' valuations v 1 and v 2 are independently drawn from the distributions G and H, respectively. If G and H are the uniform distributions on [0; 1] and [2; 3], respectively, then clearly the asymmetric auction with (G; H) generates higher revenue than the symmetric (G; G) auction and lower than the symmetric (H; H) auction.
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The asymmetry of beliefs, on the other hand, are a®ected by the mechanism of the auction and may therefore in principle be manipulated by the seller via the informational structure of the auction. Therefore, our main methodological message in this note is:
To study the e®ect of asymmetry in auctions, we have to single out the e®ect of asymmetry of beliefs by comparing two auctions using the same mechanism (¯rst price, second price, etc.) and with the same joint distribution of valuations; they di®er only in the mutual beliefs of the buyers about each other's valuations. These beliefs are symmetric in one auction and asymmetric in the other.
To illustrate this idea, consider an asymmetric auction (G; H). We would like to study the e®ect of this asymmetry by considering the following two versions of ex-ante symmetric auctions.
Figure 1: The symmetric game (s) and the asymmetric game (a).
In both versions, chance chooses with equal probability one of the pairs (G; H) or (H; G), then uses this pair to choose (independently) the valuations (v 1 ; v 2 ) and inform each buyer of his value. However, while in (s) no information is given to the buyers until they learn their values, in version (a) both buyers are informed whether the¯rst move by chance resulted in x or in y. Clearly the (a) version is equivalent to conducting one of the two asymmetric auctions (G; H) or (H; G) with equal probability. So exante the buyers are symmetric with distribution F i = Maskin and Riley [2000] ) in which the beliefs of a buyer independent of his valuation.
To achieve this, we modify the two models in the following way: we consider a game in which a chance move¯rst chooses a pair of distributions (F 1 ; F 2 ) with the following probabilities.
here ®¸0;¯¸0 and ® + 2¯· 1: Then the buyers' valuations v 1 and v 2 are drawn independently from the chosen F 1 and F 2 ; respectively.
This captures the previous games as a special case when ® = 0 and¯= 1=2 and in addition allows for independent probability distributions when ® = ¹ 2 and = ¹ (1 ¡ ¹). This is the case where the buyers' values are drawn independently from (F 1 ; F 2 ) which are chosen with probabilities: P (F i = G) = ¹; P (F i = H) = 1 ¡ ¹; for i = 1; 2 and 0 · ¹ · 1: We henceforth call this the independent case.
We can now replace the previous games of (s) and (a) by (b s) and (b a) as shown in Figures 2 and 3 . In these¯gures we make use of information set notation, that is, in (b s) no buyer is informed of the outcome of the¯rst chance move, while in (b a) this chance move is revealed to both buyers.
The symmetric game (b s):
The asymmetric game (b a):
We thus suggest to compare revenue in the independent case of the two games (b s) and (b a): we will say that the asymmetry (G; H) enhances (decreases) revenue if the revenue for game (b a) is larger (smaller) than that of game (b s):
² Note¯rst that in the independent case, both games (b s) and (b a) have the same
² Model (b a) leads (randomly) to one of the following standard independent value auctions: each is an independent, private-value auction with one of the following joint distributions: (G; G); (H; H); (G; H) or (H; G). The last two being standard, asymmetric, independent private-value auctions.
Using the aforementioned points, we can draw the following two observations about the two games.
Observation 1: In both games (b s) and (b a), for a second-price auction, it is a (weakly) dominant strategy to bid one's value. Thus, since the joint distribution of valuations is the same in (b s) and (b a), the distribution of the second highest valuation is the same and hence, the revenue of the seller is the same.
Observation 2: By revenue equivalence, in game (b s) the revenue from the¯rst-price and second-price auctions is the same.
Let us now use these observations to examine an asymmetric auction studied in the literature with an analytical solution.
² Under the second-price auction in game (b a); the seller's revenue is equal to (1=3)¹ ² We conclude that revenue from a¯rst-price auction is higher in game (b a) than in game (b s): asymmetry increases revenue:
Note that the prior distribution in Harsanyi's model (¹; 1 ¡ ¹) does not a®ect the results as long as 0 < ¹ < 1: This is not a speci¯city of this example but rather a feature of the proposed approach. If the Harsanyi model is the right framework to make the comparison, then the result should not depend on the probability distribution of the information that renders the situation asymmetric. Whether the asymmetry of (G; H)
hurts or helps the seller should not depend upon its frequency of occurrence. (1 ¡ ¹) 2 and the expected revenue in the second-price auction of game
(1 ¡ ¹) 2 :
² Therefore, using similar logic as in example 1, we conclude that revenue from is comparing the revenue in symmetric and asymmetric¯rst-price auctions. By our approach, based on these two examples, we see that these two revenue comparisons are closely related: the asymmetry generates higher revenue in¯rst-price auctions if and only if the asymmetric auction generates more revenue with a¯rst-price auction than with a second-price auction. This is in fact a general result as established by the following proposition.
Proposition 1: The asymmetry of (G; H) enhances revenue of the seller (that is, revenue in (b a) is higher than revenue in (b s)) if and only if in the asymmetric auction (G; H) the expected revenue from the¯rst-price auction R F P (G; H) is higher than that of the second-price auction R SP (G; H) . and has no e®ect in a second-price auction. Likewise, when
Proof
it is worthwhile for the seller to keep this information secret so as to maintain the symmetry of the buyers' beliefs. This is a result in the°avor of Milgrom & Weber's [1982] linkage principle addressing the revenue e®ect of the seller releasing his private information.
This proposition, in conjunction with Maskin and Riley's results are in contrast with the conclusion of Cantillon [2001] that asymmetry is disadvantageous to the seller. As the above two examples show, the asymmetry (F 1 ; F 2 ) may be advantageous or disadvantageous to the seller even if we restrict attention to CSD comparable distributions, i.e. (F s ; F w ) such that F s conditionally stochastically dominates F w .
5
The di®erence in results follows clearly from the di®erence of the two approaches:
Cantillon compares an asymmetric model (F 1 ; F 2 ) with the benchmark symmetric
These two models do not correspond to the same joint distri-5 Distribution F s conditionally stochastically dominates F w if for any x < y (for which F s (x) and F s (y) 2 (0; 1)), we have bution of valuations. 6 Hence, we argue, the di®erence between the two models is due to both the di®erence of value distributions and the di®erence in mutual beliefs.
To extend our results to the case where in the symmetric model (b s) ; (v 1 ; v 2 ) are not independent, we need to view (b s) as a more general Milgrom & Weber model, which involves the notion of a±liation:
The distribution of (v 1 ; v 2 ) with positive density f (v 1 ; v 2 ) is said to be (strictly) a±liated if for any v = (v 1 ; v 2 ) and v = (v 1 ; v 2 ) the following inequality holds:
Where _ and^denote respectively the coordinate wise maximum and minimum of the two vectors. When the opposite inequality holds, we say that (v 1 ; v 2 ) are ( (x) is increasing or h(x)=g(x) is increasing. We note that this relationship 6 The speci¯c choice of the distribution p F 1 F 2 was to guarantee the same distribution of the highest valuations and hence the same distribution of surplus in both models. However, for instance, the distribution of the second highest valuation is not the same. In fact as Cantillon shows, the expected revenue of the second-price auctions is not the same.
implies CSD: if g(x)=h(x) is increasing, then G conditionally stochastically dominates H; which in turn implies G stochastically dominates H:
7 Lemma If (G; H) are related by MLR then (in both models (b a) and (b s))
(ii) if (® +¯) 2 ¡ ® > 0 then (v 1 ; v 2 ) are negatively a±liated.
(iii) (® +¯) 2 ¡ ® = 0 if and only if (v 1 ; v 2 ) are independent.
Proof: Let (v 1 ; v 2 ) and (v 1 ; v 2 ) s.t. v 1 > v 1 and v 2 < v 2 : Assuming that G and H have positive densities g and h respectively, then the joint distribution of (v 1 ; v 2 ) in game
A su±cient condition for strict a±liation is
which yields through straightforward manipulation Likewise, the condition for strict negative a±liation is just the reverse sign of a±liation
Which is true when (G; (ii) if (® +¯) 2 ¡ ® < 0 and R F P (G; H) > R SP (G; H) then the¯rst price revenue in (b a) is higher than the¯rst-price revenue in (b s) ; that is R F P (b a) < R F P (b s) (and thus is to the advantage of the seller to keep such information secret).
(iii) if (® +¯) 2 ¡ ® = 0 and R F P (G; H) (>; =; <) R SP (G; H) ; then the¯rst price revenue in (b a) is respectively (>,=,<) the¯rst-price revenue in (b s) that is R F P (b a) (>; = ; <) R F P (b s) (this is case was covered before and does not depend upon the relationship of G and H).
Proof:
Part ( 2. When the buyers have asymmetric distributions is the¯rst-price auction better than the second price auction (asked by Maskin and Riley [2000] )?
